FATF Methodology

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Contents

List of recommendations

Technical compliance assessment

list of
results

Glossary

Immediate Outcome 1

Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropriate, actions co-ordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation.

Characteristics of an effective system

A country properly identifies, assesses and understands its money laundering and terrorist financing risks, and co-ordinates domestically to put in place actions to mitigate these risks. This includes the involvement of competent authorities and other relevant authorities; using a wide range of reliable information sources; using the assessment(s) of risks as a basis for developing and prioritising AML/CFT policies and activities; and communicating and implementing those policies and activities in a co-ordinated way across appropriate channels. The relevant competent authorities also cooperate, and co-ordinate policies and activities to combat the financing of proliferation. Over time, this results in substantial mitigation of money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
This outcome relates primarily to Recommendations 1, 2, 33 and 34 and also elements of R.15.

Note to Assessors:

Assessors are not expected to conduct an in-depth review of, or assess the country’s assessment(s) of risks. Assessors, based on their views of the reasonableness of the assessment(s) of risks, should focus on how well the competent authorities use their understanding of the risks in practice to inform policy development and actions to mitigate the risks.
Assessors should take into consideration their findings for this Immediate Outcome (IO) in their assessment of the other IOs. However, assessors should only let their findings relating to the cooperation and co-ordination of measures to combat the financing of proliferation affect the assessments of IO.11 and not of the other IOs. (i.e. IO.2 to IO.10) that deal with combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

1.1How well does the country understand its ML/TF risks?
1.2How well are the identified ML/TF risks addressed by national AML/CFT policies and activities?
1.3To what extent are the results of the assessment(s) of risks properly used to justify exemptions and support the application of enhanced measures for higher risk scenarios, or simplified measures for lower risk scenarios?
1.4To what extent are the objectives and activities of the competent authorities and SRBs consistent with the evolving national AML/CFT policies and with the ML/TF risks identified?
1.5To what extent do the competent authorities and SRBs co-operate and co-ordinate the development and implementation of policies92Having regard to AML/CFT requirements and Data Protection and Privacy rules and other similar provisions (e.g. data security / localisation) as needed. and activities to combat ML/TF and, where appropriate, the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?93Considering that there are different forms of co-operation and co-ordination between relevant authorities, Core Issue 1.5 does not prejudge a country’s choice for a particular form and applies equally to all of them.
1.6To what extent does the country ensure that respective financial institutions, DNFBPs and other sectors affected by the application of the FATF Standards are aware of the relevant results of the national ML/TF risks?

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. The country’s assessment(s) of its ML/TF risks (e.g., types of assessment(s) produced; types of assessment(s) published / communicated).
2. AML/CFT policies and strategies (e.g., AML/CFT policies, strategies and statements communicated/published; engagement and commitment at the senior officials and political level).
3. Outreach activities to private sector and relevant authorities (e.g., briefings and guidance on relevant conclusions from risk assessment(s); frequency and relevancy of consultation on policies and legislation, input to develop risk assessment(s) and other policy products).
Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. What are the methods, tools, and information used to develop, review and evaluate the conclusions of the assessment(s) of risks? How comprehensive are the information and data used?
2. How useful are strategic financial intelligence, analysis, typologies, and guidance?
3. Which competent authorities and relevant stakeholders (including financial institutions and DNFBPs) are involved in the assessment(s) of risks? How do they provide inputs to the national level ML/TF assessment(s) of risks, and at what stage?
4. Is the assessment(s) of risks kept up-to-date, reviewed regularly and responsive to significant events or developments (including new threats and trends)?
5. To what extent is the assessment(s) of risks reasonable and consistent with the ML/TF threats, vulnerabilities and specificities faced by the country? Where appropriate, does it take into account risks identified by other credible sources?
6. Do the policies of competent authorities respond to changing ML/TF risks?
7. What mechanism(s) or body do the authorities use to ensure proper and regular cooperation and co-ordination of the national framework and development and implementation of policies to combat ML/TF, at both policymaking and operational levels, and where relevant, the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Does the mechanism or body include all relevant authorities?
8. Is interagency information sharing undertaken in a timely manner in a bilateral or multiagency basis as appropriate?
9. Are there adequate resources and expertise involved in conducting the assessment(s) of risks, and for domestic co-operation and co-ordination?

Immediate Outcome 2

International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence, and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets.

Characteristics of an effective system

The country provides constructive and timely information or assistance when requested by other countries. Competent authorities assist with requests to:

locate and extradite criminals; and
identify, freeze, seize, confiscate and share assets and provide information (including evidence, financial intelligence, supervisory and beneficial ownership information) related to money laundering, terrorist financing or associated predicate offences.

Competent authorities also seek international co-operation to pursue criminals and their assets. Over time, this makes the country an unattractive location for criminals (including terrorists) to operate in, maintain their illegal proceeds in, or use as a safe haven.

This outcome relates primarily to Recommendations 36 - 40 and also elements of Recommendations 9, 15, 24, 25 and 32.

Note to Assessors:

Assessors should take into consideration how their findings on the specific role of relevant competent authorities in seeking and delivering international co-operation under this IO would impact other IOs (particularly IO.3, IO.5, IOs. 6 to 10) including how the country seeks international co-operation with respect to domestic cases when appropriate.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

2.1To what extent has the country provided constructive and timely mutual legal assistance and extradition across the range of international co-operation requests? What is the quality of such assistance provided?
2.2To what extent has the country sought legal assistance for international co-operation in an appropriate and timely manner to pursue domestic ML, associated predicate offences and TF cases which have transnational elements?
2.3To what extent do the different competent authorities seek other forms of international cooperation to exchange financial intelligence and supervisory, law enforcement or other information in an appropriate and timely manner with their foreign counterparts for AML/CFT purposes?
2.4To what extent do the different competent authorities provide (including spontaneously) other forms of international co-operation to exchange financial intelligence and supervisory, law enforcement or other information in a constructive and timely manner with their foreign counterparts for AML/CFT purposes?
2.5How well are the competent authorities providing and responding to foreign requests for co-operation in identifying and exchanging basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements?

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. Evidence of handling and making requests for international co-operation with respect to extradition, mutual legal assistance and other forms of international co-operation (e.g., number of requests made, received, processed, granted, or refused relating to different competent authorities (e.g., central authority, FIU, supervisors, and law enforcement agencies) and types of request; timeliness of response, including prioritisation of requests; cases of spontaneous dissemination / exchange).
2. Types and number of co-operation arrangements with other countries (including bilateral and multilateral MOUs, treaties, co-operation based on reciprocity, or other co-operation mechanisms).
3. Examples of: (a) making, and (b) providing successful international co-operation (e.g., making use of financial intelligence / evidence provided to or by the country (as the case may be); investigations conducted on behalf or jointly with foreign counterparts; extradition of suspects/criminals for ML/TF).
4. Information on investigations, prosecutions, confiscation and repatriation/sharing of assets (e.g., number of ML/TF investigations/ prosecutions, number and value of assets frozen and confiscated (including non-conviction-based confiscation) arising from international cooperation; value of assets repatriated or shared).
Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. What operational measures are in place to ensure that appropriate safeguards are applied, requests are handled in a confidential manner to protect the integrity of the process (e.g., investigations and inquiry), and information exchanged is used for authorised purposes?
2. What mechanisms (including case management systems) are used among the different competent authorities to receive, assess, prioritise and respond to requests for assistance?
3. What are the reasons for refusal in cases where assistance is not or cannot be provided?
4. What mechanisms (including case management systems) are used among the different competent authorities to select, prioritise and make requests for assistance?
5. How do different competent authorities ensure that relevant and accurate information is provided to the requested country to allow it to understand and assess the requests?
6. How well has the country worked with the requesting or requested country to avoid or resolve conflicts of jurisdiction or problems caused by poor quality information in requests?
7. How do competent authorities ensure that details of the contact persons and requirements for international co-operation requests are clear and easily available to requesting countries?
8. To what extent does the country prosecute its own nationals without undue delay in situations when it is unable by law to extradite them?
9. What measures and arrangements are in place to manage and repatriate assets confiscated at the request of other countries?
10. Are there aspects of the legal, operational or judicial process (e.g., excessively strict application of dual criminality requirements etc.) that impede or hinder international cooperation?
11. To what extent are competent authorities exchanging information, indirectly, with noncounterparts?
12. Are adequate resources available for: (a) receiving, managing, coordinating and responding to incoming requests for co-operation; and (b) making and coordinating requests for assistance in a timely manner?

Immediate Outcome 3

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions DNFBPs and VASPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their risks.

Characteristics of an effective system

Supervision and monitoring address and mitigate the money laundering and terrorist financing risks in the financial and other relevant sectors by:

preventing criminals and their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of, a significant or controlling interest or a management function in financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs; and
promptly identifying, remedying, and sanctioning, where appropriate, violations of AML/CFT requirements or failings in money laundering and terrorist financing risk management.

Supervisors94In relation to financial institutions and DNFBPs (but not to VASPs), references to "Supervisors" include SRBs for the purpose of the effectiveness assessment. provide financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs with adequate feedback and guidance on compliance with AML/CFT requirements. Over time, supervision and monitoring improve the level of AML/CFT compliance, and discourage attempts by criminals to abuse the financial, DNFBP and VASPs sectors, particularly in the sectors most exposed to money laundering and terrorist financing risks.

This outcome relates primarily to Recommendations 14, 15, 26 to 28 , 34 and 35, and also elements of Recommendations 1 and 40.

Note to Assessors:

Assessors should determine which financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors to weight as being most important, moderately important or less important, and should reflect their judgment in Chapters 1, 5 and 6 of the report. While judging on the overall effectiveness of this IO, assessors should explain how they have weighted the identified deficiencies and also explain how these have been taken into account in relation to how the assessors have weighted the different sectors.
When determining how to weight the various financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors, assessors should consider their relative importance, taking into account the following factors:
1. the ML/TF risks facing each sector, taking into account the materiality relevant to each sector (e.g. the relative importance of different parts of the financial sector and different DNFBPs and VASPs; the size, integration and make-up of the financial sector95E.g. including, but not limited to, the business concentration in the different sectors; the relative importance of different types of financial products or institutions; the amount of business which is domestic or cross-border; the extent to which the economy is cash-based; and estimates of the size of the informal sector and/or shadow economy), and
2. structural elements and other contextual factors (e.g. whether established supervisors with accountability, integrity and transparency are in place for each sector; and the maturity and sophistication of the regulatory and supervisory regime for each sector)96E.g. special supervisory activities, such as thematic reviews and targeted outreach to specific sectors or institutions.
For more information on how assessors should take risk, materiality, structural elements and other contextual factors into account, see paragraphs 5 to 12 of the Methodology. For more guidance on how to reflect in the report their judgment on the relative importance of the financial and DNFBP sectors, see the Mutual Evaluation Report Template in Annex II of the Methodology.
Assessors should also consider the relevant findings, including at the financial group level, the level of international co-operation which supervisors are participating in when assessing this IO.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

3.1How well does licensing, registration or other controls implemented by supervisors or other authorities prevent criminals and their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function in financial institutions, DNFBPs or VASPs? How well are breaches of such licensing or registration requirements detected?
3.2How well do the supervisors identify and maintain an understanding of the ML/TF risks in the financial and other sectors as a whole, between different sectors and types of institution, and of individual institutions?
3.3With a view to mitigating the risks, how well do supervisors, on a risk-sensitive basis, supervise or monitor the extent to which financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements?
3.4To what extent are remedial actions and/or effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applied in practice?
3.5To what extent are supervisors able to demonstrate that their actions have an effect on compliance by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs?
3.6How well do the supervisors promote a clear understanding by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs of their AML/CFT obligations and ML/TF risks?

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. Contextual factors regarding the size, composition, and structure of the financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors and informal or unregulated sector (e.g., number and types of financial institutions (including MVTS), DNFBPs and VASPs licensed or registered in each category; types of financial (including cross-border) activities; relative size, importance and materiality of sectors).
2. Supervisors’ risk models, manuals and guidance on AML/CFT (e.g., operations manuals for supervisory staff; publications outlining AML/CFT supervisory / monitoring approach; supervisory circulars, good and poor practises, thematic studies; annual reports).
3. Information on supervisory engagement with the industry, the FIU and other competent authorities on AML/CFT issues (e.g., providing guidance and training, organising meetings or promoting interactions with financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs).
4. Information on supervision (e.g., frequency, scope and nature of monitoring and inspections (onsite and off-site); nature of breaches identified; sanctions and other remedial actions (e.g., corrective actions, reprimands, fines) applied, examples of cases where sanctions and other remedial actions have improved AML/CFT compliance).
Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. What are the measures implemented to prevent the establishment or continued operation of shell banks in the country?
2. To what extent are “fit and proper” tests or other similar measures used with regard to persons holding senior management functions, holding a significant or controlling interest, or professionally accredited in financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs?
3. What measures do supervisors employ in order to assess the ML/TF risks of the sectors and entities they supervise/monitor? How often are the risk profiles reviewed, and what are the trigger events (e.g., changes in management or business activities)?
4. What measures and supervisory tools are employed to ensure that financial institutions (including financial groups), DNFBPs and VASPs are regulated and comply with their AML/CFT obligations (including those which relate to targeted financial sanctions on terrorism, and to countermeasures called for by the FATF)? To what extent has this promoted the use of the formal financial system?
5. To what extent do the frequency, intensity and scope of on-site and off-site inspections relate to the risk profile of the financial institutions (including financial group), DNFBPs and VASPs?
6. What is the level of co-operation between supervisors and other competent authorities in relation to AML/CFT (including financial group ML/TF risk management) issues? What are the circumstances where supervisors share or seek information from other competent authorities with regard to AML/CFT issues (including market entry)?
7. What measures are taken to identify, license or register, monitor and sanction as appropriate, persons who carry out MVTs and virtual asset services or activities?
8. Do supervisors have adequate resources to conduct supervision or monitoring for AML/CFT purposes, taking into account the size, complexity and risk profiles of the sector supervised or monitored?
9. What are the measures implemented to ensure that financial supervisors have operational independence so that they are not subject to undue influence on AML/CFT matters?

Immediate Outcome 4

Financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions.

Characteristics of an effective system

Financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs understand the nature and level of their money laundering and terrorist financing risks; develop and apply AML/CFT policies (including group-wide policies), internal controls, and programmes to adequately mitigate those risks; apply appropriate CDD measures to identify and verify their customers (including the beneficial owners) and conduct ongoing monitoring; adequately detect and report suspicious transactions; and comply with other AML/CFT requirements. This ultimately leads to a reduction in money laundering and terrorist financing activity within these entities.

This outcome relates primarily to Recommendations 9 to 23, and also elements of Recommendations 1, 6 and 29.

Note to Assessors:

Assessors should determine which financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors to weight as being most important, moderately important or less important, and should reflect their judgment in Chapters 1, 5 and 6 of the report. While judging on the overall effectiveness of this IO, assessors should explain how they have weighted the identified deficiencies and also explain how these have been taken into account in relation to how the assessors have weighted the different sectors.
When determining how to weight the various financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors, assessors should consider their relative importance, taking into account the following factors:
1. the ML/TF risks facing each sector, taking into account the materiality relevant to each sector (e.g. the relative importance of different parts of the financial sector and different DNFBPs and VASPs; the size, integration and make-up of the financial sector97E.g. including, but not limited to, the business concentration in the different sectors; the relative importance of different types of financial products or institutions; the amount of business which is domestic or cross-border; the extent to which the economy is cash-based; and estimates of the size of the informal sector and/or shadow economy), and
2. structural elements and other contextual factors (e.g. whether established supervisors with accountability, integrity and transparency are in place for each sector; and the maturity and sophistication of the regulatory and supervisory regime for each sector).98E.g. special supervisory activities, such as thematic reviews and targeted outreach to specific sectors or institutions
For more information on how assessors should take risk, materiality, structural elements and other contextual factors into account, see paragraphs 5 to 12 of the Methodology. For more guidance on how to reflect in the report their judgment on the relative importance of the financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors, see the Mutual Evaluation Report Template in Annex II of the Methodology.
Assessors are not expected to conduct an in-depth review of the operations of financial institutions or DNFBPs, but should consider, on the basis of evidence and interviews with supervisors, FIUs, financial institutions and DNFBPs, whether financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs have adequately assessed and understood their exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing risks; whether their policies, procedures and internal controls adequately address these risks; and whether regulatory requirements (including STR reporting) are being properly implemented.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

4.1How well do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs understand their ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations?
4.2How well do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs apply mitigating measures commensurate with their risks?
4.3How well do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs apply the CDD and record-keeping measures (including beneficial ownership information and ongoing monitoring)? To what extent is business refused when CDD is incomplete?
4.4How well do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs apply the enhanced or specific measures for: (a) PEPs, (b) correspondent banking, (c) new technologies, (d) wire transfers rules99In the context of VASPs, this refers to virtual asset transfer rules , (e) targeted financial sanctions relating to TF, and (f) higher-risk countries identified by the FATF?
4.5To what extent do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs meet their reporting obligations on the suspected proceeds of crime and funds in support of terrorism? What are the practical measures to prevent tipping-off?
4.6How well do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs apply internal controls and procedures (including at financial group level) to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements? To what extent are there legal or regulatory requirements (e.g., financial secrecy) impeding its implementation?

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. Contextual factors regarding the size, composition, and structure of the financial, DNFBP and VASP sectors and informal or unregulated sector (e.g., number and types of financial institutions (including MVTS), DNFBPs and VASPs licensed or registered in each category; types of financial (including cross-border) activities; relative size, importance and materiality of sectors).
2. Information (including trends) relating to risks and general levels of compliance (e.g., internal AML/CFT policies, procedures and programmes, trends and typologies reports).
3. Examples of compliance failures (e.g., sanitised cases; typologies on the misuse of financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs).
4. Information on compliance by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs (e.g., frequency of internal AML/CFT compliance review; nature of breaches identified and remedial actions taken or sanctions applied; frequency and quality of AML/CFT training; time taken to provide competent authorities with accurate and complete CDD information for AML/CFT purposes; accounts/relationships rejected due to incomplete CDD information; wire transfers rejected due to insufficient requisite information).
5. Information on STR reporting and other information as required by national legislation (e.g., number of STRs submitted, and the value of associated transactions; number and proportion of STRs from different sectors; the types, nature and trends in STR filings corresponding to ML/TF risks; average time taken to analyse the suspicious transaction before filing an STR).
Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. What are the measures in place to identify and deal with higher (and where relevant, lower) risk customers, business relationships, transactions, products and countries?
2. Does the manner in which AML/CFT measures are applied prevent the legitimate use of the formal financial system, and what measures are taken to promote financial inclusion?
3. To what extent do the CDD and enhanced or specific measures vary according to ML/TF risks across different sectors / types of institution, and individual institutions? What is the relative level of compliance between international financial groups and domestic institutions?
4. To what extent is there reliance on third parties for the CDD process and how well are the controls applied?
5. How well do financial institutions and groups, DNFBPs and VASPs ensure adequate access to information by the AML/CFT compliance function?
6. Do internal policies and controls of the financial institutions and groups, DNFBPs and VASPs enable timely review of: (i) complex or unusual transactions, (ii) potential STRs for reporting to the FIU, and (iii) potential false-positives? To what extent do the STRs reported contain complete, accurate and adequate information relating to the suspicious transaction?
7. What are the measures and tools employed to assess risk, formulate and review policy responses and institute appropriate risk mitigation and systems and controls for ML/TF risks?
8. How are AML/CFT policies and controls communicated to senior management and staff? What remedial actions and sanctions are taken by financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs when AML/CFT obligations are breached?
9. How well are financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs documenting their ML/TF risk assessments, and keeping them up to date?
10. Do financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs have adequate resources to implement AML/CFT policies and controls relative to their size, complexity, business activities and risk profile?
11. How well is feedback provided to assist financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions?

Immediate Outcome 5

Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments.

Characteristics of an effective system:

Measures are in place to:

prevent legal persons and arrangements from being used for criminal purposes;
make legal persons and arrangements sufficiently transparent; and
ensure that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis.

Basic information is available publicly, and beneficial ownership information is available to competent authorities. Persons who breach these measures are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. This results in legal persons and arrangements being unattractive for criminals to misuse for money laundering and terrorist financing.

This outcome relates primarily to Recommendations 24 and 25, and also elements of Recommendations 1, 10, 37 and 40.

Note to Assessors:

Assessors should also consider the relevant findings in relation to the level of international cooperation which competent authorities are participating in when assessing this Immediate Outcome. This would involve considering the extent to which competent authorities seek and are able to provide the appropriate assistance in relation to identifying and exchanging information (including beneficial ownership information) for legal persons and arrangements.

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

5.1To what extent is the information on the creation and types of legal persons and arrangements in the country available publicly?
5.2How well do the relevant competent authorities identify, assess and understand the vulnerabilities and the extent to which legal persons created in the country can be, or are being misused for ML/TF?
5.3How well has the country implemented measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons and arrangements for ML/TF purposes?
5.4To what extent can relevant competent authorities obtain adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information on all types of legal persons created in the country, in a timely manner?
5.5To what extent can relevant competent authorities obtain adequate, accurate and current beneficial ownership information on legal arrangements, in a timely manner?
5.6To what extent are effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions applied against persons who do not comply with the information requirements?

Examples of Information that could support conclusion on Core Issues
1. Contextual information on the types, forms and basic features of legal persons and arrangements in the jurisdiction.
2. Experiences of law enforcement and other relevant competent authorities (e.g., level of sanctions imposed for breach of the information requirements; where and how basic and beneficial ownership information (including information on the settler, trustee(s), protector and beneficiaries) is obtained; information used in supporting investigation).
3. Typologies and examples of the misuse of legal persons and arrangements (e.g., frequency with which criminal investigations find evidence of the country’s legal persons and arrangements being used for ML/TF; legal persons misused for illegal activities dismantled or struck-off).
4. Sources of basic and beneficial ownership information (e.g., types of public information available to financial institutions and DNFBPs; types of information held in the company registry or by the company).
5. Information on the role played by “gatekeepers” (e.g., company service providers, accountants, legal professionals) in the formation and administration of legal persons and arrangements.
6. Other information (e.g., information on existence of legal arrangements; responses (positive and negative) to requests for basic or beneficial ownership information received from other countries; information on the monitoring of quality of assistance).
Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues
1. What are the measures taken to enhance the transparency of legal persons (including dealing with bearer shares and share warrants, and nominee shareholders and directors) and arrangements?
2. How do relevant authorities ensure that accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons is maintained? Is the presence and accuracy of information monitored, tested/certified or verified?
3. To what extent is the time taken for legal persons to register changes to the required basic and beneficial ownership information adequate to ensure that the information is accurate and up to date? Where applicable, to what extent are similar changes in legal arrangements registered in a timely manner?
4. To what extent can financial institutions and DNFBPs obtain accurate and up-to-date basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements? What is the extent of information that trustees disclose to financial institutions and DNFBPs?
5. Do the relevant authorities have adequate resources to implement the measures adequately?

Immediate Outcome 1

Money laundering and terrorist financing risks are understood and, where appropriate, actions co-ordinated domestically to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation.

Characteristics of an effective system

Note to Assessors:

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Immediate Outcome 2

International co-operation delivers appropriate information, financial intelligence, and evidence, and facilitates action against criminals and their assets.

Characteristics of an effective system

Note to Assessors:

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Immediate Outcome 3

Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate financial institutions DNFBPs and VASPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their risks.

Characteristics of an effective system

Note to Assessors:

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Immediate Outcome 4

Financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions.

Characteristics of an effective system

Note to Assessors:

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

Examples of Information that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues

Immediate Outcome 5

Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments.

Characteristics of an effective system:

Note to Assessors:

Core Issues to be considered in determining if the Outcome is being achieved

Examples of Information that could support conclusion on Core Issues

Examples of Specific Factors that could support the conclusions on Core Issues